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Abstract
I investigate a spatial duopoly model with linear transportation costs as a
di¤erential game where product di¤erentiation is the result of …rms’ R&D
investments. Two related results obtain, i.e., (i) the steady state R&D invest-
ment (product di¤erentiation) is negatively (positively) related to the cost
of capital and time discounting; and (ii) if time discounting and the cost of
capital are su¢ciently high, the amount of di¤erentiation observed in steady
state is su¢ciently large to ensure the existence of a unique pure-strategy
price equilibrium with prices above marginal cost.
J.E.L. Classi…cation: L13, O31
Keywords: horizontal di¤erentiation, di¤erential games, steady state,
R&D
1 Introduction
Ever since Hotelling’s (1929) seminal contribution, the role of product dif-
ferentiation as a remedy to the fragility of market equilibrium under price
competition has represented a core issue in the …eld of industrial organiza-
tion.
However, under horizontal product di¤erentiation, an established result
is that a pure-strategy equilibrium in prices may not always exist (see, inter
alia, d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986; Economides,
1986; Anderson, 1988). More precisely, a subgame perfect equilibrium with
prices greater than marginal cost may fail to exist, because …rms’ location
choices drive prices to marginal cost when transportation costs are linear (or
not su¢ciently convex) in the distance between the generic consumer and
the …rm he decides to patronise. This non-existence problem has generated
a stream of literature proposing several remedies, either by adopting non-
linear transportation cost functions (d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Stahl, 1982;
Economides, 1986) or by adopting the Stackelberg equilibrium as the solution
concept (Anderson, 1987), or by choosing appropriate distribution functions
for the population of consumers (de Palma et al., 1985; Neven, 1986), or a
mix thereof (Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995; Lambertini, 1997, 2000).1
In this paper, I illustrate an alternative route, which consists in nesting
Hotelling’s linear transportation cost problem into a di¤erential game with
R&D for product innovation. This entails that location is no longer a control
variable, since product design is the outcome of …rms’ intertemporal R&D
1For exhaustive accounts of the debate, see Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991); Anderson et
al. (1992); Anderson et al. (1997).
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e¤orts, i.e., investment is the control variable while location (and therefore
product di¤erentiation) becomes a state variable which varies over time. I
show that there are conditions on time preferences (and the cost of capital)
such that …rms choose long run equilibrium locations where there exists no
undercutting incentive, and therefore a price equilibrium does exist with
prices above marginal production costs in correspondence to a steady state
degree of di¤erentiation which is not minimum. This result is derived under
both open and closed loop solutions. There emerges that the range of time
discounting (or the rental price of capital) wherein the game produces a price
equilibrium in pure strategies is wider under the closed loop solution than
under the open loop solution.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model and
the non-existence problem are introduced in section 2. Section 3 describes
the di¤erential game. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2 The basic setup
Examine …rst the static problem, as originally formulated by Hotelling (1929).
I consider a market for horizontally di¤erentiated products where consumers
are uniformly distributed with unit density along the unit interval [0; 1], the
linear city. Two single-product pro…t-maximising …rms, labelled as 1 and 2,
sell a di¤erentiated good along the segment. Product locations are x1 and
x2: On the basis of the symmetry of the model, I assume that x1 · 1=2 and
x2 ¸ 1=2 :2 The generic consumer located at a 2 [0; 1] buys one unit of the
2This assumption that …rm 1 (respectively, 2) is located to the left (right) of 1/2 is
meant to exclude the possibility of leapfrogging by either …rm. As in Tabuchi and Thisse
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good to maximise his utility:
U = s¡ pi ¡ c jxi ¡ aj ¸ 0; i = 1; 2; (1)
where xi and pi are …rm’s i location and mill price, respectively, and c > 0
is the transportation cost rate. In the remainder of the paper, I suppose
that the reservation price s is never binding, so that full market coverage
always obtains. One can easily derive from (1) the location ba 2 (x1; x2)3 of
the consumer who is indi¤erent between the two goods at generic price and
location pairs,
s¡ p1 ¡ c(ba¡ x1) = s¡ p2 ¡ c(x2 ¡ ba); (2)
as well as the demand functions:
y1 =
p2 ¡ p1 + c(x1 + x2)
2c
; y2 =
p1 ¡ p2 + c(2¡ x1 ¡ x2)
2c
: (3)
Unit production cost is assumed to be constant and equal across varieties.
Without further loss of generality, I normalise it to zero. Therefore, …rm i’s
pro…t function is ¼i = piyi:
Firms play noncooperatively a two-stage game where they move simul-
taneously at both stages. In the …rst, …rms choose locations, in the second
they choose prices. The solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium
by backward induction.
(1995) and Lambertini (1997), …rms are allowed to locate also outside the city boundaries.
This assumption is discussed in section 3.
3If this condition is not met, e.g., if the indi¤erence condition is written under the
assumption that a 2 (x2; 1]; then it can be immediately veri…ed that the location of the
indi¤erent consumer is unde…ned.
3
First order conditions (FOCs) at the market stage yield the following
candidate equilibrium prices:
p¤1 =
c (2 + x1 + x2)
3
; p¤2 =
c (4¡ x1 ¡ x2)
3
: (4)
The above prices are strictly positive for all x1 2 [0; 1=2] and x2 2 [1=2; 1] :
However, as proved by d’Aspremont et al. (1979), if …rms locate in [1=4; 3=4];
there exists an incentive for each of them to undercut the rival’s price by
setting:
pui = pj ¡ c jxi ¡ xjj ; for all pj > 0: (5)
That is, demand functions are discontinuous at pui ; since at that price, given
any pj ; …rm i becomes a monopolist and …rm j is driven out of business.
Therefore, the price pair (4) cannot be an equilibrium outcome for all loca-
tions. Moreover, at the …rst stage we have:
@¼1
@x1
> 0 ;
@¼2
@x2
< 0 (6)
for all admissible fx1; x2g ; which entails that …rms are lead towards the mid-
point by pro…t incentives at the …rst stage of the game. That is, the choice
of location drives …rms precisely into the segment where the pure-strategy
equilibrium with prices above marginal production cost (i.e., in this setting,
with positive prices) fails to exist.4 By altering the transportation cost func-
tion from linear to quadratic, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) obtain a tractable
model where a unique pure-strategy price equilibrium exists for all location
pairs. In particular, the adoption of quadratic disutility of transportation
4The price equilibrium always exists in mixed strategies (see Dasgupta and Maskin,
1986; Osborne and Pitchik, 1987).
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eliminates the incentive to undercut, and equilibrium prices are zero if and
only if di¤erentiation is nil.
3 The di¤erential game
The non-existence problem described above stems from the fact that, with
linear transportation costs, the incentive to di¤erentiate products is weaker
than the incentive to move towards the middle of the market so as to increase
the demand basin for a product. That is, …rms are attracted by the median
(and average) consumer. This creates a price war through undercutting,
that drives equilibrium prices and pro…ts to zero. A possible remedy to
this problem consists in making it costly for …rms to design their respective
products according to the preferences of the median consumer. This is what
I propose here.
The instantaneous pro…t is ¼i(t) = pi(t)yi(t) ¡ ½ki(t); where ki(t) is the
amount of resources invested in R&D by …rm i at time t; and ½ is the rental
price of capital, which in the remainder of the paper is assumed to be equal
to the discount rate common to both …rms. By symmetry, I focus upon the
behaviour of …rm 2. She can modify the location of her product through
R&D investment according to:
@x2(t)
@t
= ¡ k2(t)
1 + k2(t)
¢ x2(t) ; k2(t) ¸ 0 ; x2(0) ¸ 1 : (7)
Notice that the condition x2(0) ¸ 1 potentially allows for any degree of
di¤erentiation to emerge at the long-run equilibrium. The R&D technology
de…ned by (7) exhibits decreasing returns to scale.5 The rationale behind (7)
5See Cellini and Lambertini (1999) for further discussion of (7).
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is that the R&D technology is shaped so as to reproduce the tendency for
…rms to locate towards the middle of the linear city, which characterises the
static model described in section 2.6
Firm 2 aims at maximizing the discounted value of her ‡ow of pro…ts
J2 =
R1
0
e¡½t¼2(t) dt under the dynamic constraint (7) concerning the state
variable x2(t). The control variables are pi(t) and ki(t). It is worth stress-
ing that the undercutting incentive still exists within the second and third
quartiles of the linear city. Yet, the fact that location xi(t) is no longer a
control variable in the dynamic formulation of the duopoly game opens the
possibility for the …rms not to be a¤ected by the undercutting problem in
steady state.
The Hamiltonian function is:
H2(t) = e¡½t ¢
½
p2 [p1 ¡ p2 + c(2¡ x1 ¡ x2)]
2c
¡ ½k2(t)¡ ¸2(t)k2(t)x2(t)
1 + k2(t)
¾
;
(8)
where ¸2(t) = ¹2(t)e
½t; ¹2(t) being the co-state variable associated to x2(t):
6The relevant di¤erence is that, in the present setting, relocation towards 1/2 is costly.
Alternatively, one could examine a technology such that
@x1(t)
@t
< 0 and
@x2(t)
@t
> 0 ;
pulling …rms outwards as time goes by. This, however, would appear as a rather ad hoc
assumption to the aim of preventing …rms from entering the product range where the
undercutting incentive destroys the pure-strategy price equilibrium.
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3.1 The open loop solution
In the open loop formulation of the game, the necessary and su¢cient con-
ditions for a path to be optimal are:7
@H2(t)
@p2(t)
=
p1(t)¡ 2p2(t) + c [2¡ x1(t)¡ x2(t)]
2c
= 0 ; (9)
@H2(t)
@k2(t)
= ¡½ [1 + k2(t)]
2 + ¸2(t)x2(t)
[1 + k2(t)]
2 = 0 ; (10)
¡@H2(t)
@x2(t)
=
@¹2(t)
@t
) @¸2(t)
@t
= ¸2(t)
µ
k2(t)
1 + k2(t)
+ ½
¶
+
p2(t)
2
; (11)
lim
t!1 ¹2(t) ¢ x2(t) = 0 : (12)
From the FOCs w.r.t. prices I obtain:
p¤1(t) =
c [2 + x1(t) + x2(t)]
3
; p¤2(t) =
c [4¡ x1(t)¡ x2(t)]
3
; (13)
which coincide with the optimal prices (4) characterising the static game.
From (10) I obtain:
¸2(t) = ¡½ [1 + k2(t)]
2
x2(t)
(14)
as well as
k2(t) =
s
¡¸2(t)x2(t)
½
¡ 1 ; (15)
which allows me to establish:
@k2(t)
@t
_ ¡@¸2(t)
@t
x2(t)¡ @x2(t)
@t
¸2(t) : (16)
7The FOC w.r.t. price for …rm 1 is:
@H1(t)
@p1(t)
=
p2(t) ¡ 2p1(t) + c [x1(t) + x2(t)]
2c
= 0
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Substituting (13) and (14) into (16), and using the symmetry condition
x1(t) = 1¡ x2(t); I can rewrite (16) as follows:
@k2(t)
@t
_ ½2 [1 + k2(t)]2 ¡ c
2
x2(t) : (17)
The expression on the r.h.s. of (17) is equal to zero at:8
k¤2(t) = ¡1 +
1
½
r
c
2
x2(t) ; (18)
with
k¤2(t) > 0 for all ½ <
r
c
2
x2(t) (19)
@k2(t)
@t
> 0 for all k2(t) > k
¤
2(t) (20)
@k2(t)
@t
< 0 for all k2(t) 2 (0 ; k¤2(t)) : (21)
Obviously,
@x2(t)
@t
> 0 always. Expression (18) immediately yields the fol-
lowing intuitive result:
Lemma 1 The open loop steady state R&D investment is decreasing in the
cost of capital and in intertemporal discounting.
Now observe that
k¤2(t) = 0 i¤ x2(t) = x
¤
2 =
2
c
½2 (22)
where
2
c
½2 2
µ
3
4
; 1
¸
for all ½ 2
Ãr
3c
8
;
r
c
2
#
: (23)
8The smaller root can be disregarded as it is always negative.
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The phase diagram is illustrated in …gure 1, where I describe a situation in
which x2(0) > 3=4 and ½ 2
Ãr
3c
8
;
r
c
2
!
:9
Figure 1 : Dynamics in the space (x2; k2)
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- x20
3/4
k2
x2(0)x¤2
@k2(t)
@t
= 0
¾ 6
¾
?
Considering the stability of the system, it remains to be stressed that,
whenever x¤2 > 3=4 ; it is a saddle.
10 The above discussion can be summarised
in the following:
Proposition 1 For all ½ >
r
3c
8
; the open loop game reaches a steady state
9Whether x2(0) (respectively, x1(0)) is larger or smaller than 1 (resp., 0) is irrelevant
as to the graphical representation of the problem, as long as x2(0) (resp., x1(0)) is larger
(lower) than 3/4 (1/4).
10The complete proof is omitted, since this property immediately results from the dy-
namics of x2(t) and k2(t) as described by horizontal and vertical arrows in …gure 1.
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at
k¤2 = 0 ; x
¤
2 =
2
c
½2 >
3
4
which is a saddle, where there exists no undercutting incentive.
The above Proposition produces the following Corollaries:
Corollary 1 The steady state degree of product di¤erentiation is positively
related with the cost of capital and time discounting.
Corollary 2 Given x2(0) ¸ 1 ; maximum di¤erentiation obtains in steady
state if ½ =
r
c
2
.
The above property highlights that the dynamic model, where intertem-
poral investment is the relevant control variable, is intrinsically di¤erent from
its static counterpart, where the …rst order conditions w.r.t. locations gener-
ate the well known minimum di¤erentiation principle. When product design
becomes costly, then the presence of linear disutility of transportation does
not necessarily induce …rms to seek for the product preferred by the median
(and average) consumer, which in turn triggers the undercutting process.
This, obviously, happens when the parameter measuring the rental prices of
capital as well as time discounting is su¢ciently low to drive …rms within the
second and third quartiles of the linear city. Then, as a …nal result, we have
the following:
Corollary 3 For all ½ >
r
3c
8
; the open loop solution of the game produces
a unique price equilibrium in pure strategies, with strictly positive prices.
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As a complement to Corollary 3, it is worth observing that the under-
cutting incentive still operates when x¤1 2 [1=4 ; 1=2] and x¤2 2 [1=2 ; 3=4] ;
which happens for all ½ <
r
3c
8
: That is, when the cost of capital and time
discounting are su¢ciently low, …rms are driven into the region where the
price equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
3.2 The closed loop solution
The characterisation of the Markov (subgame) perfect equilibrium (MPE)
under the closed loop solution usually requires solving the relevant Bellman
equation.11 Given that the Hamiltonian problem de…ned in (8) is not written
in a linear-quadratic form, the Bellman - Hamilton - Jacobi su¢cient condi-
tions for a MPE cannot be solved. However, I am going to show that, in the
present case, the necessary conditions of the closed loop formulation su¢ce
to characterise the MPE.
First order conditions are (9), (10), (12) and
¡@H2(t)
@x2(t)
¡ @H2(t)
@p1(t)
¢ @p
¤
1(t)
@x1(t)
=
@¹2(t)
@t
; (24)
where the term
@H2(t)
@p1(t)
¢ @p
br
1 (t)
@x1(t)
=
p2(t)
4
describes the feedback e¤ect which
does not appear in the open loop formulation.12 The derivative
@pbr1 (t)
@x1(t)
is
11See Bas¸ar and Olsder (1982, 19952), Mehlmann (1988), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
pp. 520-36), Vives (1999, pp. 336-47), inter alia.
12Notice that
¡@H2(t)
@k1(t)
¢ @k1(t)
@x1(t)
does not appear in (24), in that
@H2(t)
@k1(t)
= 0:
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calculated on the basis of …rm 1’s best reply function in the price space,
pbr1 (t) =
p2(t) + c (x1 + x2)
2
; (25)
which is the solution to:
@H1(t)
@p1(t)
=
@
@p1(t)
(p1y1) =
p2(t)¡ 2p1(t) + c (x1 + x2)
2c
= 0 : (26)
Condition (24) yields:
@¸2(t)
@t
= ¸2(t)
µ
k2(t)
1 + k2(t)
+ ½
¶
+
p2(t)
3
: (27)
The dynamics of k2(t) is de…ned as in (16), which now simpli…es as follows:
@k2(t)
@t
_ ½2 [1 + k2(t)]2 ¡ c
4
x2(t) : (28)
The only acceptable root of the r.h.s. of (28) is:
k¤2(t) = ¡1 +
1
2½
p
cx2(t) ; (29)
k¤2(t) > 0 for all ½ <
1
2
p
cx2(t) ; (30)
with qualitatively the same properties as outlined in (20-21) as well as in
…gure 1. Obviously, the result stated in Lemma 1 applies in the closed loop
formulation as well. Now observe that
k¤2(t) = 0 i¤ x2(t) = x
¤
2 =
4
c
½2 (31)
where
3
c
½2 2
µ
3
4
; 1
¸
for all ½ 2
Ãp
3c
4
;
r
c
2
#
: (32)
By comparing (31) with (22), the following Lemma obtains:
12
Lemma 2 The steady state degree of product di¤erentiation is larger under
the closed loop solution than under the open loop solution.
The above Lemma implies the …nal result:
Proposition 2 The critical threshold of the discount rate (or the cost of
capital) above which there exists a price equilibrium in pure strategies is lower
under the closed loop solution than under the open loop solution.
As a …nal remark, notice that, obviously, from (13) and given x¤1+x
¤
2 = 1;
equilibrium prices (and consequently equilibrium outputs) are the same under
both the open loop and the closed loop solution, i.e., p¤1 = p2 = c (and
y¤1 = y
¤
2 = 1=2).
4 Concluding remarks
I have reformulated the spatial duopoly model with linear transportation
costs as a di¤erential game where location is costly and therefore product
di¤erentiation is the result of …rms’ R&D decisions over time. I have charac-
terised both the open loop and the closed loop solution. This has generated
two related results. The …rst is that the steady state R&D investment (prod-
uct di¤erentiation) is negatively (positively) related to the cost of capital
and time discounting. The second is that, if time discounting and the cost of
capital are su¢ciently high, the amount of di¤erentiation observed in steady
state is su¢ciently large to ensure the existence of a unique pure-strategy
price equilibrium with prices above marginal cost. Product di¤erentiation
in steady state is larger under the closed loop solution than under the open
13
loop solution. Consequently, the range of discount rates such that a pure
strategy equilibrium exists is larger under the closed loop solution.
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